Observations on the Status and Impact of the Judicial Confirmation Process by Jones, Edith H.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 39




Observations on the Status and Impact of the
Judicial Confirmation Process
Edith H. Jones
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Legal
Profession Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Symposium Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edith H. Jones, Observations on the Status and Impact of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 833 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss3/6
OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATUS AND IMPACT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROCESS
The Honorable Edith H. Jones *
My parents, who met in the coat-closets that held Texas's Re-
publican Party during the 1950s and '60s, introduced me to the
idealism and pugilism of politics. On the latter subject, my
mother repeated a lesson she had learned: "They will always fight
to the last drop of your blood." How true that lesson has proved to
be!
It is an honor to participate in this Symposium as the only per-
son who has undergone United States Senate confirmation to a
judicial post, and thus the only contributor with actual, albeit in-
consequential, experience of "bloodletting." From that perspec-
tive, and from my judicial experience, I offer observations on the
brutality of the current confirmation process.
Partisan fights over the federal judiciary came with the terri-
tory of Article III lifetime tenure.' They have existed since Presi-
dent Adams appointed federal judges just as he was leaving of-
fice, and the new Jefferson Administration retaliated with
attempts to abolish their posts and to impeach certain federal-
that is to say Federalist-judges.2 In more recent times, President
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. B.A., 1971, Cornell
University; J.D., 1974, University of Texas School of Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that "[tihe Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour"); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 92 (1985) (arguing that "the upper house of Congress has
been scrutinizing Supreme Court nominees and rejecting them on the basis of their politi-
cal, judicial, and economic philosophies ever since George Washington was President").
2. See JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION 133-34, 163-66 (2002); see also Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137-38 (1803); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE
COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 56 (1988); Louise
Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2003) (describing how President John
Adams appointed the so-called "midnight judges" as he was leaving office and thereafter
President Thomas Jefferson refused to honor those appointments). See generally HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
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Franklin Roosevelt advanced a scheme to overturn the Supreme
Court's anti-New Deal rulings by enlarging its membership.3
Richard Nixon ran for office in 1968 with a vow to reverse the
trend of the Warren Court's activist decisions through his Su-
preme Court appointments.4 Supreme Court nominees of both
Presidents Johnson and Nixon had to withdraw their names after
embarrassing revelations surfaced during the confirmation proc-
ess.' The charges may or may not have justified excluding them,
but the heightened scrutiny of the nominees played out against a
vociferous debate over the role of federal courts.
Likewise, that debate over the federal courts' role, particularly
as arbiter of the Constitution, is nothing new.6 Jefferson de-
scribed the federal judiciary as "the great object of... fear."7 He
predicted that federal judges would steadily usurp jurisdiction as
a "subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under
ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric."
8
Nevertheless, and painting with a very broad brush, I would state
that not until the 1960s did the full power of the federal judiciary
prove itself. It was then that the Warren Court undertook to re-
make society by, inter alia, upending the criminal justice system,
changing accepted ideas of the relation of church and state, and
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (rev. ed. 1999) (reviewing all Supreme
Court nominations from 1789 to 1999).
3. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1164, 1175-76 (1988) (describing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's effort to "pack"
courts with Justices who agreed with his New Deal politics).
4. See Paul Finkelman, You Can't Always Get What You Want... : Presidential Elec-
tions and Supreme Court Appointments, 35 TULSA L.J. 473, 477 (2000); see also ABRAHAM,
supra note 2, at 9-10; ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 180 (2d ed.
1994); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 15.
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey K Tulis, Constitutional Abdication: The Senate, the President,
and Appointments to the Supreme Court, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1331, 1342-46 (1997)
(describing how some Supreme Court nominees have been denied confirmation due to al-
leged personal improprieties).
6. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-74, 177-78; Weinberg, supra note 2,
at 1239-40, 1411.
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Mar. 9, 1821), in JAMES F.
SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION 9 (2002) ("The great object of my fear is the federal judici-
ary. That body, like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot & unalarming advance, [is]
gaining ground step by step.... Let the eye of vigilance never be closed.").
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 170 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
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challenging conventional morality.' Whatever one thinks of the
wisdom of these policies, they were ordained in court decisions by
unrepresentative, unelected, politically unaccountable judges.
Since that momentous decade, it has been feared, or hoped, as the
case may be, that a different corps of judges, appointed by suc-
ceeding presidents, would change these policies by changing the
constitutional law. The judicial confirmation process has thus
been seen as key to controlling the federal courts and, not so indi-
rectly, our constitutional system.°
As the social policy stakes have gotten higher, confirmation
battles have extended from the Supreme Court to a large portion
of appellate court appointments. My own nomination to the Fifth
Circuit in 1985 occurred at the dawn of this development. I will
use my experience as a foil for the subsequent deterioration of the
process.
On paper, I hope, I looked like a good candidate for the federal
bench. I graduated from Cornell University (an Ivy League insti-
tution), made it into the top ten percent of the University of Texas
School of Law, and was a University of Texas Law Review editor.
My specialties in law practice were litigation and bankruptcy. I
became the first woman partner at Andrews, Kurth, Campbell &
Jones, a major Houston law firm, after we had had two sons. Still,
it took about nine months from the day I received an inquiry
about a federal judgeship until Senate confirmation. Two initial
hurdles in the confirmation process are often overlooked and de-
serve mention, as they alone may deter qualified lawyers from
even seeking judicial posts. These are the intrusive financial dis-
closure requirements and the redundant personal and profes-
sional background checks. 1 The financial revelations were en-
9. See generally Jim Chen, Come Back to the Nickel and Five: Tracing the Warren
Court's Pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203 (2002); Edith
H. Jones, The Nature of Man According to the Supreme Court, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 237
(1999); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Remembrance of the Things Past?: Reflections on the
Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055 (2002).
10. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Poli-
cymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 610 (2001) (reviewing Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957)) (stat-
ing the theory that the Constitution can be controlled by controlling the judiciary).
11. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 779, 785 (1989). Note that the former statutory requirements, formerly codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-09, were repealed in 1991 and financial disclosure state-
ments are no longer required of judicial nominees, while extensive background checks are
still in place. At the same time, information on an individual's finances are often easily
obtainable with the increase of information available through the Internet.
20051
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tirely out of proportion to the public's need to know or to the de-
mands of recusal. The background checks, completed independ-
ently by the White House, Senate, F.B.I., and ABA, involve con-
siderable overlap and an enormous paperwork burden even for
the candidate without significant opposition.12 Especially prob-
lematic is the F.B.I. investigation, in which information on the
candidate is gathered and reported but not necessarily verified.
In my case, after dozens of interviews, the F.B.I. agent returned
to my office with follow-up questions. He seriously inquired about
a jesting comment of a friend of ours that my husband was "ad-
dicted" to Coke (Coca-Cola)! The agent also asked about the deed
to our former home, because the chain of title, which originated in
Houston in the 1950s, included a racially restrictive covenant. We
purchased the house long after such covenants became unen-
forceable and did not know it existed. From this kind of feedback,
and from having observed other background investigations of ju-
dicial candidates, I came to conclude that F.B.I. background
checks, though undoubtedly necessary, can too easily degenerate
into gossip-mongering and misunderstandings.
While I supplied information and had some control over these
parts of the process, the progress of my nomination and confirma-
tion was otherwise frustratingly opaque. I knew nothing direct
about any opposition at the time, and received only a few phone
calls suggesting, in veiled terms, that confirmation might be du-
bious. Both the ABA Judicial Qualifications Committee and Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond, then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, apparently had misgivings about my relative youth.
Nevertheless, my confirmation hearing lasted less than ten min-
utes, and Senator Thurmond was the only senator present.
Ignorance may be bliss, or it may just be ignorance. Believing I
could and should not influence my chances, I went about law
practice as usual. Some clients were concerned about my longev-
ity at the firm, but fortunately, we had sufficient depth to reas-
sure them of adequate representation during this period of uncer-
tainty.
My confirmation experience was thus protracted and discomfit-
ing, but not unbearable. No one assailed my character, dissected
my nascent judicial philosophy, or interrupted our family life. In
12. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Role of Ideology in Confirming Federal Court Judges,
15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 127, 128 (2001).
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fact, I am unaware whether the Democrats, then in the minority
in the Senate, raised any concrete objections to my confirmation.
Conditions changed rapidly, however, after the Democrats re-
gained control of the Senate in the 1986 elections.13 It had been
no secret that President Reagan was seeking judicial nominees
who would interpret the Constitution according to its "original in-
tent" rather than as a "living document" that must be updated to
modern times. 4 Professor Lino Graglia reflected the Administra-
tion's view when he wrote early in 1986 of the burgeoning recog-
nition that most of the noted Supreme Court decisions of recent
years had little to do with the Constitution.15 Accordingly, he
complained, serious constitutional interpretation had more or less
been abandoned.16 Professor Graglia predicted that the intellec-
tual effort to interpret the Constitution without regard to its lan-
guage and history must ultimately fail, because such judicial ac-
tivism is at war with our principles of democratic self-
government.' 7 These views were anathema to many Democrats,
who favor an expansionist view of federal courts in order, they be-
lieve, to secure the rights of individuals against majority oppres-
sion. Consequently, just after the Democrats re-took a majority in
the Senate during President Reagan's second term, Professor
Sheldon Goldman, who has studied the judicial confirmation
process for many years, opined that confirmation battles would
become more contentious."i But he added that neither side
wanted to reject judges on ideology alone. 9 From both Graglia
and Goldman, then, famous last words.
13. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 291-326 (describing the historical con-
text of the recent confirmation tension); SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 74-149 (describing
how the confirmation process intensified after 1985).
14. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 291-92.
15. Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 35, 38-39 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
16. See id. at 39-42.
17. Id. at 49.
18. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at
Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 339 (1987).
19. Id. Professor Goldman stated:
As a practical matter, ideology alone cannot be the basis for turning down a
lower court nominee because liberals are not in a majority in the Senate.
Also, liberal Democrats, by using ideology as the sole basis for opposition,
would provide a precedent for Republicans to oppose liberal Democratic
nominees sent by a future Democratic president.
If ideology were to become the basis for opposition to lower court nomina-
tions, the result would be a continual series of battles between liberals and
2005]
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In late 1987, Judge Bork's confirmation battle occurred, and a
new verb was added to the English vocabulary.2" Contrary to Pro-
fessor Goldman's prediction, Judge Bork's "ideology" was the
principal focus of the Senate hearings.2' And, contrary to Profes-
sor Graglia, Professor Ronald Dworkin proclaimed, after the Bork
nomination failed, that original intent "has suffered a strong re-
versal."22 The Bork nomination was a watershed. While oppo-
nents of judicial nominees had long been politically motivated, for
the first time they challenged an extraordinarily well-qualified
nominee not for his fitness or character but for his judicial
23views. Further, the confirmation struggle proceeded much like
an election contest, resulting in the perception that one side's
"policies" had prevailed when Judge Bork's nomination was de-
feated.24 The intertwining of the nominee's views and the outcome
of constitutional cases exposed and promoted the cynical principle
that constitutional adjudication is little more than the continua-
tion of "politics by other means."25
Nearly twenty years after the Bork nomination, Graglia's and
Dworkin's approaches to constitutional interpretation still con-
the administration, with the federal judiciary held hostage during an inevita-
bly prolonged confirmation process. It is doubtful that either side desires such
an outcome.
Id.
20. BORK (bork), vb. Slang. 1. (Of the U.S. Senate) to reject a nominee, esp. for
the U.S. Supreme Court, on grounds of the nominee's unorthodox political and
legal philosophy. * The term derives from the name of Robert Bork, President
Ronald Reagan's unsuccessful nominee for the Supreme Court in 1987. 2. (Of
political and legal activists) to embark on a media campaign to pressure U.S.
Senators into rejecting a President's nominee. 3. Generally, to smear a political
opponent.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 196 (8th ed. 2004).
21. See, e.g., Taylor McConkie, Note, The Senate's New Battlefield: The Role of Ideol-
ogy in Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POLY 175, 184-85 (2002)
(discussing Senator Ted Kennedy's opposition to Judge Bork's "reactionary ideology" and
Kennedy's belief that "the Senate has every right to take that ideology into account in act-
ing on the nomination").
22. Bill Blum, The Hearings and Original Intent, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 78, 80.
23. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 214-26 (1989).
24. See id. at 322-52.
25. See CHRIS HABLES GRAY, POSTMODERN WAR: THE NEW POLITICS OF CONFLICT 258-
59 (1997) (quoting Michel Foucalt in stating that "politics and power are 'war continued by
other means,'" an inversion of the famous quote by Carl von Clausewitz that "war is poli-
tics pursued by other means"); see also Aaron Schwabach, Kosovo: Virtual War and Inter-
national War, 15 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 1, 7 (2003) (discussing the Clausewitz quote
and the political nature of war and the war-like nature of politics). See generally
BRONNER, supra note 23, at 341.
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tend for ascendancy on the Supreme Court, and the Court's self-
assertion into critical areas of social and even war policy has
hardly diminished.26 Unsurprisingly, the politicization of judicial
confirmations that began with Judge Bork has spread down to
nominees for the lower federal courts.
The theme has been repeated in this Symposium that partisan
fights over lower court nominees blossomed during the Clinton
Presidency when the Republicans, as the majority in the Senate
after 1994, arbitrarily withheld hearings and confirmation votes
on well-qualified candidates. No doubt, the Senate Republicans
engaged in such tactics, but I disagree that obstructionism began
with President Clinton's nominees. 2' During the Reagan and
Bush Administrations, the ABA's Judicial Qualifications Commit-
tee was highly political and used its insider position, from which
it vetted candidates before their nomination by the president, to
undermine or delay nominations.29 The ABA Committee ratings
often seemed unnaturally stingy for candidates whose views
might augur an originalist judicial approach, while they showed
no bias against probable activist appointees.3 ° Most prominent, of
course, was the Committee's decision that Judge Bork-former
Yale professor, Solicitor General, prolific author, and an appellate
judge whose decisions had never been overturned by the Supreme
Court-was "unqualified."31 Other examples of the Committee's
26. BRONNER, supra note 23, at 348-49.
27. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 291-326; SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 74-149.
29. See generally Victor Williams, The ABA Judgemaker Committee is Exposed, Albeit
Shaded from FACA Sunshine, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 249, 253-60 (1989) (describing the
history of the ABA in the nomination process).
30. See, e.g., id.; see also James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association's
Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. &
POL. 1, 26 (2001) (concluding based on a statistical analysis that the ABA ratings, con-
trolled for educational credentials and non-judicial experience, significantly favored Clin-
ton nominees compared to Bush nominees); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377,
1482(1998).
31. Laura E. Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are
We Ready to Give up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37,44 (2001). President
George W. Bush responded to the politicized ABA ratings system by removing the commit-
tee from the pre-nomination process. Id. at 37; see also Letter from Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to President George W. Bush, to Martha W. Barnett, President, American Bar
Association (Mar. 22, 2001), http://www.white house.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010322-
5.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). Senate Democrats, currently in the minority, continue
to seek ABA ratings for the President's nominees. Interestingly, the ABA's ratings have
been more evenhanded in recent years. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 30, at 2. But see Mi-
chael J. Saks & Neil Vidmar, Asserted But Unproven: A Further Response to the Lindgren
2005]
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apparent bias arose in my circuit. There were at least three dis-
trict court candidates, one of whom was a Democrat and another
of whom had served as president of a major bar organization, who
were denied hearings by the ABA Committee for many months.
There was also a candidate for the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit who had been first in his law school class, had clerked for
the Supreme Court of the United States, and had been a re-
spected and successful lawyer in Texas, but the ABA rated him
"not qualified." Because the ABA Committee impeded nomina-
tions of Reagan and Bush judges from inside the process, and be-
cause it cloaked its actions in nonpartisan rhetoric, its obstruc-
tionism from the 1980s until 1993 is occasionally, but
unjustifiably, overlooked.
As noted, the Senate Republicans retaliated by delaying some
of President Clinton's nominations inordinately. 2 But Republican
tactics, at least, neither besmirched the candidates' reputations
nor waged open warfare on their judicial philosophy. President
Clinton, in any event, succeeded in having a number of "progres-
sive" jurists confirmed, as their opinions subsequently prove, and
his two "progressive" Supreme Court nominees sped through the
process unscathed.13 All in all, during his two terms in office,
President Clinton appointed as many federal judges as did Presi-
dent Reagan. 4
Now we arrive at President George W. Bush's courts of appeals
nominees. The process was destined to reach a new low when
Senator Schumer announced at the outset of the Administration
that some Democrats would oppose any nominees "who are of a
particular ideological cast."3 This threat is particularly bellicose,
Study's Claim That the American Bar Association's Ratings of Judicial Nominees Are Bi-
ased, 19 J.L. & POL. 177 (2003) (contesting Professor Lindgren's theory that the ABA rat-
ings are biased).
32. See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Ap-
pointments Process Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1,
14-15 (2003).
33. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 318-26 (discussing the appointments of Jus-
tice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer).
34. See Free Congress Foundation, Federal Judicial Vacancies, at http://www.judicial
selection.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2005) (showing that President Clinton appointed a total
of 374 federal judges, while President Reagan appointed a total of 378); see also CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, JUDICIAL NOMINATION STATISTICS: U.S. DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT
COURTS, 1977-2003, at CRS-13 tbl.2(b) (2004), available at http://www.senate.gov/refer
ence/resources/pdffRL31635.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
35. Jonathan Ringel, High-Minded Chat Doesn't End Discord, NAT. L.J., July 9, 2001,
at A20. Senator Charles Schumer (D.-N.Y.), Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
[Vol. 39:833
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given that lower court judges are required, regardless of their ju-
dicial philosophy, to follow Supreme Court precedent. Ten of the
Bush nominees are being filibustered in the Senate despite their
being satisfactory to an absolute majority of senators who would
vote on confirmation. 6 Some of these individuals were nominated
as far back as May 2001 and continue to be filibustered." The de-
laying tactics have thus extended throughout the first Bush
term. One extraordinarily talented nominee, Miguel Estrada,
was forced to withdraw his name after repeated attempts to
break a filibuster were unsuccessful, and Estrada found he could
not continue to pursue his law practice under a cloud of uncer-
tainty. 9 Other nominees were confirmed only after unfounded
public assaults on their integrity, judicial philosophy, and impar-
tiality.4 °
The intemperance and injustice of the overtly ideologized con-
firmation process are, in my view, amply demonstrated by the
fate of two nominees to the Fifth Circuit. One of them graduated
at the top of her law school class, had the highest grade on the
bar exam, became a partner in a prestigious Texas law firm, is a
distinguished member of the Texas Supreme Court, has routinely
been endorsed by all of the major Texas newspapers, and received
the highest qualification rating of the ABA Committee.4 1 Nomi-
nated over three years ago, she has undergone days of unin-
formed and hostile Senate debates. 2 She has yet to receive a
Senate vote. That person, Justice Priscilla Owen, is being filibus-
Administrative Oversight and the Courts, made the following statement: "If the president
sends countless nominees who are of a particular ideological cast, Democrats will likely
exercise their constitutionally given power to deny confirmation so that such nominees do
not reorient the direction of the federal judiciary." Id.; see also John S. Baker, Jr., Ideology
and the Confirmation of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 177, 177 n.1 (2001).
36. See 150 CONG. REC. S8593 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). For
a brief summary of the ten filibustered nominees see the Independent Judiciary website at
http://www.independentjudiciary.com/nominees/index.cfm?CategoryID=8 (last visited Jan.
29, 2005).
37. 147 CONG. REC. S5765 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (nominating Charles W. Pickering,
Sr. to be United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit).
38. 149 CONG. REC. S5832 (daily ed. May 7, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (describ-
ing the unprecedented "anniversary" of judicial delays).
39. See 149 CONG. REC. S11,062-65 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2003); see also 150 CONG. REC.
S3525-26 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2004) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
40. See generally 149 CONG. REC. S15,952 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Cornyn) (asking that past grievances be set aside).
41. 149 CONG. REC. S5458 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
42. See id. at S5458-72.
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tered.43 The second nominee should be considered a hero of the
Civil Rights Movement in Mississippi in the 1960s: a man coura-
geous enough to send his children to a desegregated school at a
time when few other whites did so; a man who courted personal
danger by prosecuting Ku Klux Klan members; and a man who
was earlier confirmed to a federal district court bench with little
or no opposition.44 Yet this nominee, Judge Charles Pickering,
was also filibustered and labeled a racist.45 Judge Pickering ulti-
mately accepted a recess appointment that allows him to hold of-
fice on the Court of Appeals until the end of 2004 unless he re-
ceives a Senate vote.4' Though journalist Mike Wallace became
Judge Pickering's defender in a detailed story on CBS's "60 Min-
utes" news show, even that endorsement has not garnered him a
vote.47
While the fights over the Pickering and Owen nominations
were waged in Washington as political battles, the nominees
could not ethically "campaign" or defend themselves against at-
tacks. All they could do was respond to literally hundreds of de-
tailed questions about hundreds of their prior legal opinions.
Each candidate spent many days preparing for contentious Sen-
ate confirmation hearings. For months, these nominees' normal
personal and professional lives came to a standstill. Unfortu-
nately, the experiences of Justice Owen and Judge Pickering typ-
ify what other contested nominees have recently endured. Highly
qualified professionals have been targeted for attack almost ran-
domly and then subjected to public character assassination and
humiliation; all because they were among the relatively few tal-
ented lawyers willing to take a significant cut in pay in order to
serve on the federal bench.4' The Senate's process has come to re-
43. 149 CONG. REC. S5832 (daily ed. May 7, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cornyn); see also
150 CONG. REC. S3525 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2004) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
44. See 149 CONG. REC. S13,842-43 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cham-
bliss); see also 150 CONG. REC. S 170-74 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
45. 149 CONG. REC. at S13,843 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2003).
46. 150 CONG. REC. S170 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Judge
Pickering has recently retired from the bench and withdrawn his name from further con-
sideration for a permanent appointment to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. See Adam Liptak, Judge Appointed by Bush after Impasse in Senate Retires,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A22.
47. 60 Minutes: Judge Pickering Denies Racism (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 28,
2004), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/25/60minutes/main608667.shtml (last
visited Jan. 29, 2005).
48. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S15,952-53 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Cornyn).
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semble not a deliberative function, but a spectacle like those at
the Roman Coliseum where prisoners were thrown to wild beasts
with only the barest tools of self-defense.
That the current confirmation process has deleterious effects
on judicial appointments is obvious.4" Both the number and qual-
ity of candidates are reduced. The partisan bullying over a nomi-
nee's ideology is intended to and does exert a chilling effect on
prospective candidates for judgeships."0 Lawyers who aspire to
the bench understand that they must adapt their career paths to
a strategy most congenial to assuming judicial office. Thus, they
will neither write nor speak publicly on controversial subjects.
They may avoid representing clients in certain high-profile or pro
bono cases. They may refuse to become involved in public policy
debates where their positions might come back to haunt them.
Self-muzzling by prospective judicial candidates limits their ca-
reers and preparation for the federal bench, yet it affords the only
hope of avoiding a bloody confirmation process. Many qualified
lawyers, moreover, will simply never consider a judgeship either
because they will not be muzzled or because they have no desire
to suffer the indignities and capriciousness of the confirmation
process.
These chilling effects will ultimately reverberate throughout
the legal marketplace of ideas as bright, ambitious individuals
become discouraged from investigating and discussing the means
and ends of constitutional adjudication. Anyone who believes in
the importance of political speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment should recoil at this prospect. The politicization of
judicial confirmations insidiously deters the open and honest de-
bates that are essential to the development of our legal system.51
49. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article III
Protections, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 221, 233-37 (2003); see also 150 CONG. REC. S3525-26 (daily
ed. Apr. 1, 2004) (statement of Sen. Cornyn); 149 CONG. REC. S11,062-65 (daily ed. Sept.
4, 2003) (discussing the withdrawal of Miguel Estrada's nomination); 149 CONG. REC.
S5832 (daily ed. May 7, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
50. See, e.g., George, supra note 49, at 241-47 (noting that "[p]oliticized selection is
likely to produce ... more political decisionmakers .... Moreover, the autonomy of federal
judges as well as their personal ambition may also prevent them from reaching decisions
free from bias").
51. Id. at 246 ("Judges who hope to be promoted have reason to believe that their rul-
ings, at least in visible cases, will affect their chances of success."); cf Mark A. Cohen, Ex-
plaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" About the Sentencing Commis-
sion?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 192-95 (1991) (finding that federal judges who were more
likely to be promoted were also more likely to vote to uphold the Federal Sentencing
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Contentious confirmation battles also carry the Senate into
dangerous territory. The threat of an intrusive, ceaseless, and
highly-charged confirmation process may well lead judicial nomi-
nees to tailor their views to secure easier confirmation. Having
been forced to compromise their principles and take public s tands
on issues during confirmation, the now-confirmed judges may feel
morally obliged to decide cases in accordance with those compli-
ant-but hastily formed-opinions. The ideological confirmation
process in this way imperils the independence of the judiciary.52
Further, when the price of Senate confirmation is essentially a
demand for ideological conformity, the confirmation process en-
croaches on the President's appointment power. Some senators'
insistence that President George W. Bush nominate individuals
who were nominated but not confirmed during the Clinton Ad-
ministration signaled confusion, to say the least, as to which
branch of the federal government holds the constitutional ap-
pointment power.53 Even if the precise scope of the Senate's ad-
vise and consent authority is debatable, it cannot be coequal with
the appointment power.54
How far the Senate processes have strayed from their proper
scope was confirmed last winter by the revelation of documents
which showed that certain interest groups were attempting to de-
lay confirmation hearings and thus appointments to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in order to influence
Guidelines and to impose harsher penalties in antitrust cases).
52. See generally George, supra note 49, at 246 (arguing that the politicization ofjudi-
cial selection imposes dangerous political pressure on the judiciary and creates a political
culture that can both directly and indirectly influence the independence of the judiciary).
53. 149 CONG. REC. S9433-34 (daily ed. July 16, 2003) (noting that Senators Levin
and Stabenow would continue to object to George W. Bush's judicial nominees to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit until former President Bill Clinton's
nominees to the same circuit were renominated).
54. See, e.g., Dr. John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and
Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 635 (2003). Dr. Eastman refutes the claim that
the Senate has a co-equal role in nominating judges and states:
[The claim that the Senate has a co-equal role in nominating judges] is incon-
sistent with the Constitution's text and the history of the advice and consent
power.
... [T]he Framers of the Constitution assigned to the President the sole
power to nominate and the primary power in appointing judges. They did this
because they wanted the accountability that came with placing the appoint-
ment power in a single individual. They specifically refused to give the power
of appointment to the Senate because they knew the tendency of public bodies
to feel no personal responsibility and to give full play to intrigue and cabal.
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the outcome of pending cases.5 Any such attempt to control the
federal judiciary from the halls of the Senate must be investi-
gated and punished. This kind of manipulation is intolerable; it
strikes at the basic integrity of the judicial process.
Finally, notwithstanding our life tenure, judges currently on
the bench are affected by the partisan confirmation battles (even
beyond the Sixth Circuit instance just mentioned). 6 Should the
delays in confirmations continue, the courts of appeals will suffer
further attrition from deaths or retirements, and the appellate
caseload may become intolerable. The orderly and thoughtful
disposition of appeals will be at risk. There are also subtly corro-
sive effects on the development of the law. A judge who harbors
the aspiration to a higher judicial office may strive to confine his
rulings to narrow or non-controversial issues even though a more
definitive ruling would be desirable.58 The temptation to trim
one's sails in pursuit of an ambitious career path has always ex-
isted in the judiciary as elsewhere, but the temptation may turn
into a trend when confirmation battles are more expressly politi-
cal contests.59 The nominee with the shortest paper trail, and ar-
guably the least contribution to the law, will satisfy political ex-
pediency. By sure but quiet steps, the process threatens the
independence of judicial pronouncements. And, in any event, the
overarching impact of a crassly political process diminishes the
credibility of federal courts and respect for the law itself.6 °
55. 149 CONG. REC. S15,952-54 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
These documents can be viewed at http://fairjudiciary.com/cf-contents/press/collusion
memos.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
56. See George, supra note 49, at 245-46 (arguing that some judges "may limit their
behavior to prevent a possible challenge to their promotion" to a higher court).
57. For a discussion of the delays in judicial confirmations see supra notes 35-48 and
accompanying text.
58. George, supra note 49, at 244-47.
59. Id. at 247 ("Judicial selection accordingly is inherently political and not strictly
merit-based. Politicized selection is likely to produce relatively more political decision-
makers, and it does. Moreover, the autonomy of federal judges as well as their personal
ambition may also prevent them from reaching decisions free from bias.").
60. Professor Marshall agrees about the deleterious consequences of the current con-
firmation process, but he argues that judicial conservatism is as "activist" in pursuit of
policies allegedly desired by political conservatives as is liberal judicial activism on behalf
of liberal political goals. See William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nominations Wars, 39 U.
RICH. L. REV. 819, 826-32 (2005). Hence, according to Professor Marshall, political liberals
are fully justified in selectively opposing President Bush's judicial nominees. Id. at 828.
Space does not permit a point-by-point refutation of Professor Marshall's examples of "ac-
tivism." Suffice it to state here that his reciting a crude scorecard that categorizes parties
to Supreme Court litigation as "low-income, minority, or otherwise disenfranchised" (a)
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These observations would not be complete without some predic-
tion of what the future will bring or some prescription to resolve
the current impasse. In a previous article, I concluded that:
The problems of judicial selection, in my view, are not so much a
cause as a symptom of the deeper division in views as to what consti-
tutes the rule of law. If the purpose of law, broadly speaking, is to ef-
fectuate political change, then, clearly, judges are political actors
who must be accountable to the public like other politicians. If, on
the other hand, the principal role of judges is to interpret existing
law, while changes of legal policy are within the province of the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of government, then judges have a
more limited, though still essential, role in democratic government.
For much of the twentieth century, mandarins of the law viewed the
courts as agents of social change and the law as contingent, evolu-
tionary, and ultimately subservient to political expediency. Federal
judges long ago caught on to this heightened view of their power, and
it was inevitable that state judges would do the same. As judge-made
law became more involved in politically sensitive areas, the appoint-
ing authorities reacted accordingly. The politicization of selection
processes followed the politicization of judicial decision-making,
which in turn followed twentieth century currents of judicial phi-
losophy. Today's "ethics" of judicial selection recognizes the politici-
zation of the judges' role.
The restoration of more civil and objective selection processes will
not occur until the reigning legal philosophy becomes less ambitious
and overweening. That is to say, when the rule of law is again teth-
ered to respect for the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment; to traditional legal craftsmanship, to continuity, to moral val-
ues; and to limited social aims, judicial selection will not provoke
such battles. Philosophical change of this dimension often takes dec-
ades to mature and influence society's thinking.
6 1
Three years later, my diagnosis of the root problem and the
timeline for its ultimate solution remain the same. The prospect
for a short-term remedy to the politicized judicial confirmation
process is grim, however, barring a decisive change of personnel
or rules in the Senate. The indiscriminate use of the filibuster
assumes his conclusion; (b) insults anyone who has taken a judicial oath; and (c) fails to do
what good lawyers should do-evaluate each decision on its legal merits. Should the
reader assume that because certain Justices less frequently agree on decisions with, for
example, Justices Scalia or Thomas, those Justices are biased against non-low-income,
non-minority, and popular (non-disenfranchised) parties? If so, where does the Constitu-
tion justify any such judicial bias? These debates would surely move forward if, rather
than stooping to the simplistic political slogans in evaluating judicial candidates and dis-
cussing constitutional issues, the actors would behave more like the talented lawyers
many of them are, rather than like hucksters.
61. Judge Edith H. Jones, Foreword to Symposium: The Ethics of Judicial Selection,
43 S. TEx. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001).
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and the resort to public character assassination in hearings are
reminiscent of tactics employed fifty years ago by southern sena-
tors and Joseph McCarthy to achieve their ends. We now know,
of course, that those tactics represented the dying gasp of doomed
movements. Politicizing the selection of federal judges ought to
share the same fate.
62. See generally JACK ANDERSON & RONALD W. MAY, MCCARTHY: THE MAN, THE
SENATOR, THE "ISM" 341-48 (1952) (describing the McCarthy era and Joseph McCarthy's
use of politics to shape both the judiciary and society).
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